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Summary 
Financial derivatives allow users to manage or hedge certain business risks that arise from 
volatile commodity prices, interest rates, foreign currencies, and a wide range of other variables. 
Derivatives also permit potentially risky speculation on future trends in those rates and prices. 
Derivatives markets are very large—measured in the hundreds of trillions of dollars—and they 
grew rapidly in the years before the recent financial crisis. The events of the crisis have sparked 
calls for fundamental reform. 
Derivatives are traded in two kinds of markets: on regulated exchanges and in an unregulated 
over-the-counter (OTC) market. During the crisis, the web of risk exposures arising from OTC 
derivatives contracts complicated the potential failures of major market participants like Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG. In deciding whether to provide federal support, regulators 
had to consider not only the direct impact of those firms failing, but also the effect of any failure 
on their derivatives counterparties. Because OTC derivatives are unregulated, little information 
was available about the extent and distribution of possible derivatives-related losses. 
The OTC market is dominated by a few dozen large financial institutions who act as dealers. 
Before the crisis, the OTC dealer system was viewed as robust, and as a means for dispersing risk 
throughout the financial system. The idea that OTC derivatives tend to promote financial stability 
has been challenged by the crisis, as many of the major dealers required infusions of capital from 
the government. 
Derivatives reform legislation before Congress would require the OTC market to adopt some of 
the practices of the regulated exchange markets, which were able to cope with financial volatility 
in 2008 without government aid. A central theme of derivatives reform is requiring OTC contracts 
to be cleared by a central counterparty, or derivatives clearing organization. Clearinghouses 
remove the credit risk inherent in bilateral OTC contracts by guaranteeing payment on both sides 
of derivatives contracts. They impose initial margin (or collateral) requirements to cover potential 
losses initially. They further impose variation margin to cover any additional ongoing potential 
losses. The purpose of posting margin is to prevent a build-up of uncovered risk exposures like 
AIG’s. Proponents of clearing argue that if AIG had had to post initial margin and variation 
margin on its trades in credit default swaps, it would likely have run out of money before its 
position became a systemic threat that resulted in costly government intervention. 
Benefits of mandatory clearing include greater market transparency, as the clearinghouse 
monitors, records and usually confirms trades. Clearing may reduce systemic risk, by mitigating 
the possibility of nonpayment by counterparties. There are also costs to clearing. Margin 
requirements impose cash demands on “end users” of derivatives, such as nonfinancial firms who 
used OTC contracts to hedge risk. H.R. 3795, different versions of which were ordered to be 
reported by the House Committees on Financial Services and on Agriculture, and Title VII of the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs’ comprehensive financial reform 
proposal provide exemptions from mandatory clearing for certain categories of market 
participants. If exemptions are too broad, then systemic risks, as well as default risks to dealers 
and counterparties, may remain. The bills seek to balance the competing goals of reducing 
systemic risk and preserving end users’ ability to hedge risks through derivatives, without causing 
those derivatives trades to become too costly. This report analyzes the issues of derivatives 
clearing and margin and end users, and it discusses the various legislative approaches to the end-
user issue. This report will be updated as events warrant. Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
 
Congressional Research Service 
Contents 
General Background ...................................................................................................................1 
Market Structure and Regulation.................................................................................................2 
Derivatives Reform.....................................................................................................................4 
End Users ...................................................................................................................................5 
Exemptions for End Users...........................................................................................................7 
Safeguards Applicable to Uncleared OTC Swaps.......................................................................10 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Derivatives Market Structures: Exchange and Over-the-Counter (OTC)........................3 
Figure 2. OTC Swap Counterparties............................................................................................6 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Clearing and Margin Requirements in House Financial Services, House 
Agriculture, and Senate Banking Committees OTC Derivatives Reform Proposals...................8 
 
Contacts 
Author Contact Information......................................................................................................10 
 Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
 
Congressional Research Service  1 
General Background 
Derivative contracts are an array of financial instruments with one feature in common: their value 
is linked to changes in some underlying variable, such as the price of a physical commodity, a 
stock index, or an interest rate. Derivatives contracts—futures contracts, options, and swaps
1—
gain or lose value as the underlying rates or prices change, even though the holder may not 
actually own the underlying asset. 
Thousands of firms use derivatives to manage risk. For example, a firm can protect itself against 
increases in the price of a commodity that it uses in production by entering into a derivative 
contract that will gain value if the price of the commodity rises. A notable instance of this type of 
hedging strategy was Southwest Airlines’ derivatives position that allowed it to buy jet fuel at a 
low fixed price in 2008 when energy prices reached record highs. When used to hedge risk, 
derivatives can protect businesses (and sometimes their customers as well) from unfavorable 
price shocks. 
Others use derivatives to seek profits by betting on which way prices will move. Such speculators 
provide liquidity to the market—they assume the risks that hedgers wish to avoid. The combined 
trading activity of hedgers and speculators provides another public benefit: price discovery. By 
incorporating all known information and expectations about future prices, derivatives markets 
generate prices that often serve as a reference point for transactions in the underlying markets. 
Although derivatives trading had its origins in agriculture, today most derivatives are linked to 
financial variables, such as interest rates, foreign exchange, stock prices and indices, and the 
creditworthiness of issuers of bonds. The market is measured in the hundreds of trillions of 
dollars, and billions of contracts are traded annually. 
Derivatives have also played a part in the development of complex financial instruments, such as 
bonds backed by pools of other assets. They can be used to create “synthetic” securities—
contracts structured to replicate the returns on individual securities or portfolios of stocks, bonds, 
or other derivatives. Although the basic concepts of derivative finance are neither new nor 
particularly difficult, much of the most sophisticated financial engineering of the past few 
decades has involved the construction of increasingly complex mathematical models of how 
markets move and how different financial variables interact. Derivatives trading is often a 
primary path through which such research reaches the marketplace. 
Since 2000, growth in derivatives markets has been explosive (although the financial crisis has 
caused some retrenchment since 2008). Between 2000 and the end of 2008, the volume of 
derivatives contracts traded on exchanges,
2 such as futures exchanges, and the notional value of 
total contracts traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market
3 grew by 475% and 522%, 
                                                 
1 For a description of the mechanics of these contracts, see CRS Report R40646, Derivatives Regulation in the 111
th 
Congress, by Mark Jickling and Rena S. Miller. 
2 See Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Table 23B, for year 2000 turnover for derivative financial instruments 
traded on organized exchanges, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa0206.pdf. For December 2008 figures 
for derivatives traded on organized exchanges, see BIS Quarterly Review, September 2009, International Banking and 
Financial Market Developments, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0909.pdf. 
3 See Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Statistical Annex, Table 19, December, 2000 figure for notional amount 
of total OTC contracts, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa0206.pdf. See Bank for International 
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respectively. By contrast, during nearly unprecedented credit and housing booms, the respective 
value of corporate bonds and home mortgages outstanding grew by 95% and 115% over the same 
period.
4 
Market Structure and Regulation 
Although the various types of derivatives are used for the same purposes—avoiding business risk, 
or hedging, and taking on risk in search of speculative profits—the instruments are traded on 
different types of markets. Futures contracts are traded on exchanges regulated by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); stock options on exchanges under the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC);and swaps (and some options) are traded OTC, and they are not 
regulated by anyone. 
Exchanges are centralized markets where all the buying interest comes together. Traders who 
want to buy, or take a long position, interact with those who want to sell, or go short, and deals 
are made and prices reported throughout the day. In the OTC market, contracts are made 
bilaterally, typically between a dealer and an end user, and there is generally no requirement that 
the price, the terms, or even the existence of the contract be disclosed to a regulator or to the 
public. 
Derivatives can be volatile contracts, and the normal expectation is that there will be big gains 
and big losses among traders. As a result, there is a problem of market design. How do the longs 
know that the shorts will be able to meet their obligations, and vice versa? A market where 
billions of contracts change hands is impossible if all traders must investigate the 
creditworthiness of the other trader, or counterparty. The way this credit risk—often called 
counterparty risk—is managed is a key element of the current reform proposals. 
The exchanges deal with the issue of credit risk through a clearinghouse. Once the trade is made 
on the exchange floor (or electronic network), it goes to the clearinghouse,
5 which guarantees 
payment to both parties. The process is shown in Figure 1. Traders then do not have to worry 
about counterparty default: the clearinghouse stands behind all trades. How does the 
clearinghouse ensure that it can meet its obligations? 
Clearing depends on a system of margin, or collateral. Before the trade, both the long and short 
traders have to deposit an initial margin payment with the clearinghouse to cover potential losses. 
Then at the end of each trading day, all contracts are repriced, or “marked to market,” and all 
those who have lost money (because prices moved against them) must post additional margin 
(called variation or maintenance margin) to cover those losses before the next trading session. 
This is known as a margin call: traders must make good on their losses immediately, or their 
broker may close out their positions when trading opens the next day. The effect of the margin 
system is that no one can build up a large paper loss that could damage the clearinghouse in case 
                                                             
(...continued) 
Settlements (BIS), BIS Quarterly Review, September 2009, Statistical Annex, Table 19, for December 2008 figure for 
notional amount of total OTC contracts, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa0909.pdf. 
4 Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, September 17, 2009, accessible at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1r-1.pdf. 
5 Also referred to as a central counterparty or as (in the statutory phrase) a derivatives clearing organization (DCO). Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
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of default: it is certainly possible to lose large amounts of money trading on the futures 
exchanges, but only on a “pay as you go” basis. 
Figure 1. Derivatives Market Structures: Exchange and Over-the-Counter (OTC) 
 
Source: CRS. 
In the OTC market, as shown in the right side of Figure 1, there is a network of dealers rather 
than a centralized marketplace. Firms that act as dealers stand ready to take either long or short 
positions, and make money on spreads and fees. The dealer absorbs the credit risk of customer 
default, while the customer faces the risk of dealer default. In this kind of market, one would 
expect the dealers to be the most solid and creditworthy financial institutions, and in fact the OTC 
market that has emerged is dominated by two or three dozen firms—very large institutions like JP 
Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and their foreign counterparts. Before 2007, such 
firms were generally viewed as too well diversified or too well managed to fail; since 2008, they 
are more likely considered too big to be allowed to fail. 
In the OTC market, some contracts require collateral or margin, but not all. There is no standard 
practice: all contract terms are negotiable. A trade group, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) publishes best practice standards for use of collateral, but compliance is 
voluntary. 
The terms “collateral” and “margin” are similar—both are forms of a downpayment against 
potential losses to guard against a counterparty’s nonpayment—but technically they are not 
interchangeable. A margining agreement requires that cash or very liquid securities be deposited 
immediately with the counterparty. After this initial deposit, margin accounts are marked-to-
market, usually daily. In the event of default, the counterparty holding the margin can liquidate 
the margin account. By contrast, collateral arrangements usually require the counterparty to Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
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perfect a lien against the collateral.
6 The range of assets allowable under a collateral agreement is 
usually wider than what is allowed under margining arrangements.
7 Settlement of collateral 
shortfalls tends to be less frequent than under margining arrangements.
8 
Because there is no universal, mandatory system of margin, large uncollateralized losses can 
build up in the OTC market. The best-known example in the crisis was AIG, which wrote about 
$1.8 trillion worth of credit default swaps guaranteeing payment if certain mortgage-backed 
securities defaulted or experienced other “credit events.”
9 Many of AIG’s contracts did require it 
to post collateral as the credit quality of the underlying securities (or AIG’s own credit rating) 
deteriorated, but AIG did not post initial margin, as this was deemed unnecessary because of the 
firm’s triple-A rating. As the subprime crisis worsened, AIG was subjected to margin calls that it 
could not meet. To avert bankruptcy, with the risk of global financial chaos, the Federal Reserve 




The AIG case illustrates two aspects of OTC markets that are central to derivatives reform 
proposals. First, as noted above, AIG was able to amass an OTC derivatives position so large that 
it threatened to destabilize the entire financial system when the firm suffered unexpected losses, 
and the risks of default to AIG derivatives counterparties grew. In a market with mandatory 
clearing and margin, in which AIG would have been required to post initial margin to cover 
potential losses, there is a stronger possibility that AIG would have run out of money long before 
the size of its position reached $1.8 trillion.  
Second, because OTC contracts are not reported to regulators, the Fed and the Treasury lacked 
information about which institutions were exposed to AIG, and the size of those exposures. 
Uncertainty among market participants about the size and distribution of potential derivatives 
losses flowing from the failure of a major dealer was a factor that exacerbated the “freezing” of 
credit markets during the peaks of the crisis, and made banks unwilling to lend to each other. 
A basic theme in the derivatives reform proposals before the 111
th Congress is to get the OTC 
market to act more like the exchange market—in particular, to have bilateral OTC swaps cleared 
by a third-party clearing organization. There are some widely recognized benefits to clearing: 
•  Reduction of counterparty risk—collateral or margin collected by the 
clearinghouse prevents risk build-ups that could trigger systemic disruptions, and  
                                                 
6 To perfect a lien means following certain procedures required by law in order to create a security interest that is 
enforceable. 
7 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Risk Management of Financial Derivatives, January, 1997, Appendix J, 
“Credit Enhancements”, p. 183, accessible at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/deriv.pdf. 
8 Ibid. 
9 The credit events that trigger credit swap payments may include ratings downgrades, debt restructuring, late payment 
of interest or principal, as well as default. 
10 For an account of this process, see Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
("SIGTARP”), Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties, November 17, 2009. Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
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•  Transparency—because information on trades and positions is centralized in the 
clearinghouse, regulators will know who owes what to whom, improving the 
ability to respond to a crisis. In addition, as price information becomes public, 
dealer spreads should narrow, reducing the costs of hedging and other 
transactions. 
At the same time, there are costs associated with a clearing regime that requires all participants to 
post margin. Firms that use derivatives to hedge business risks take positions that move in the 
opposite direction to the underlying market. In the example of Southwest Airlines, imagine that 
energy prices had dropped sharply, instead of rising as they actually did. The reduced fuel costs 
would have been good for the airline’s bottom line, but its derivatives position would have lost 
money, and had the contracts been cleared, it would have had to post margin to cover those 
losses. Such losses would not threaten the firm’s solvency, because it would still be effectively 
paying a price for fuel that allowed it to operate at a profit.
11 However, the margin demands could 
have created liquidity problems. In the current debate, “end users” of OTC derivatives argue that 
the costs of posting margin may prevent them from hedging, leaving them exposed to greater 
business risks. 
End Users 
The derivatives proposals put forward by the Obama Administration, the House Committees on 
Agriculture and Financial Services, and the Senate Banking Committee all include exemptions 
from clearing requirements intended to avoid placing burdensome costs on end users of 
derivatives. End user is not a term defined in statute. In general, it refers to any OTC derivatives 
counterparty that is not a dealer, although in the current debate it sometimes appears to refer 
primarily to nonfinancial firms that use derivatives to hedge the risks of their businesses. How 
much of the OTC market do they account for? 
                                                 
11 In other words, a hedging strategy locks in the price that prevails at the time the contract is made. If the firm loses 
money at that price, it will not hedge. Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
 
Congressional Research Service  6 




Dealers, 34% Financial 
Institutions, 56%
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
Notes: Includes OTC interest rate, foreign currency, and equity contracts. 
The Bank for International Settlements publishes data on counterparties in several OTC markets. 
As of June 2009, 34% of OTC contracts were between reporting dealers, 56% were between 
dealers and other financial institutions, and the remaining 10% involved dealers and nonfinancial 
entities (see Figure 2).
12 
Thus, nearly two-thirds of OTC derivatives involve an end user. If all end users are exempted 
from the requirement that OTC swaps be cleared, the market structure problems raised by AIG 
still remain. That is, if individual dealer firms that retain large amounts of credit risk get into 
trouble, the government will continue to face an unsatisfactory choice: allow the dealer to fail, 
and risk panic and cascading failures among interconnected dealers and counterparties, or provide 
a taxpayer bailout, with the undesirable consequence of reducing incentives for private parties to 
manage risk prudently. 
Derivatives reform legislation seeks to strike a balance. Although the primary goal is to eliminate 
the problem of derivatives dealers that are too big or too interconnected to fail, the bills provide 
                                                 
12 The markets covered are interest rate, foreign exchange, and equity derivatives (excluding credit default swaps). The 
total notional value of these contracts was $493 trillion. Bank for International Settlements, Semiannual OTC 
derivatives statistics at end-June 2009, accessible at http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm. Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
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exemptions for end users whose derivatives positions are intended to hedge business risk and who 
are not thought to pose systemic risk. The bills differ in the way they define classes of market 
participants who are to be subject to the mandatory clearing requirement (as well as other forms 
of regulation) and in the way the exemptions are structured. 
Exemptions for End Users 
The House Committee on Financial Services and the House Committee on Agriculture have each 
ordered to be reported separate versions of H.R. 3795, the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets 
Act of 2009.
13 The Senate Banking Committee published a committee print of a draft 
comprehensive financial reform bill on November 16, 2009. Title VII of the Restoring American 
Financial Stability Act deals with regulation of OTC derivatives. Each of these proposals uses the 
Obama Administration’s proposed legislative language as a base text, but all depart from the 
model in significant ways. 
Table 1 below sets out the exemptions provided in the House and Senate proposals in a side-by-
side format. 
                                                 
13 The House Committee on Financial Services approved the bill on October 15, 2009, by a vote of 43-26. The House 
Committee on Agriculture approved its version by voice vote on October 21, 2009. Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
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Table 1. Clearing and Margin Requirements in House Financial Services, House 
Agriculture, and Senate Banking Committees OTC Derivatives Reform Proposals 
Provision House  Financial 
Services 
House Agriculture  Senate Banking 
Swaps that can be 
cleared 
Swaps that the SEC and/or CFTC determine to be acceptable for clearing 
if no derivatives clearing 
organization (DCO) will 
accept the swap for 
clearing, or 
if no clearing organization 
can clear a swap or class 
of swaps in accordance 
with the core regulatory 
principles that apply to 
DCOs, or 
if no derivatives clearing 
organization will accept the 
swap for clearing, or 
Swaps are exempt 
from the clearing 
requirement… 
if one of the counterparties 
is not a swap dealer or a 
major swap participant 
if one of counterparties is 
not swap dealer or major 
swap participant; and 
demonstrates to CFTC or 
SEC how it generally 
meets its financial 
obligations associated 
with entering into 
noncleared swaps 
if one counterparty is not a 
swap dealer or major swap 
participant; and does not meet 
the eligibility requirements of 
any derivatives clearing 
organization that clears the 
swap. (Such exemptions 
require an SEC or CFTC 
finding that they are consistent 
with the public interest) 
Someone who is not a swap dealer, and 
maintains a substantial net 
position in outstanding 
swaps, excluding positions 
held primarily for hedging, 
reducing, or otherwise 
mitigating commercial risk; 
or 
maintains a substantial net 
position in outstanding 
swaps, excluding positions 
held primarily for hedging, 
reducing or otherwise 
mitigating its commercial 
risk; or 
whose outstanding swaps 
create net counterparty credit 
exposures (current or potential 
future exposures) to other 
market participants that would 
expose those other market 
participants to significant credit 
losses in the event of the 
person’s default. 
Who is a “major swap 
participant”? 
whose outstanding swaps 
create substantial net 
counterparty exposure 
(current and potential 
future) that would expose 
counterparties to significant 
credit losses that could 
have a material adverse 
effect on capital of the 
counterparties. 
whose outstanding swaps 
create substantial net 
counterparty exposure 
that could have serious 
adverse effects on the 
financial stability of the 
United States banking 






Threshold that regulators 
determine prudent for 
effective monitoring, 
management and oversight 
of financial system 
Threshold that regulator 
determines prudent for 
effective monitoring, 
management and 
oversight of entities which 
are systemically important 
or can significantly impact 
financial system 
No provision. 
Source: The Congressional Research Service. Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
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Some basic elements are present in all three bills. First, transactions between swap dealers and 
major swap participants (MSPs) must be cleared, as long as a clearing organization will accept 
the swap and the appropriate regulators approve the swap for clearing. The purpose of this 
exception is twofold: (1) clearinghouses should not be forced to clear contracts that might pose 
risks to their solvency (as might be the case if a contract were highly customized, complex, 
difficult to price, or if the risk exposure of a class of contracts were concentrated in a single 
dealer), and (2) the regulatory approval requirement ensures that there will not be a “race to the 
bottom” among clearinghouses, in which competition for market share and clearing fees leads to 
imprudent risk taking. 
In addition to the clearing requirement, dealers and MSPs will be subject to prudential capital 
requirements and other forms of regulatory oversight. Thus, to the end users, the definition of 
“major swap participant” is crucial because it determines the scope of exemptions from the 
clearing requirement. 
All three bills define MSP in ways that attempt to minimize the likelihood that trades in uncleared 
swaps will present significant financial risks. The House bills make holding a “substantial net 
position”—to be defined by the regulators—a prerequisite for MSP status. However, a substantial 
net position does not make one an MSP if the position is used for hedging. But then, there is an 
exception to this exception: even a hedging position may qualify one as an MSP if the position 
creates counterparty risk that could threaten systemic stability (the Agriculture version) or could 
have a material adverse effect on capital of the counterparties (the Financial Services version). 
The Senate Banking Committee proposal, in its Title VII, on the other hand, defines MSP in a 
way that may capture more derivatives market participants. It does not use the “substantial net 
position” test, but includes within the MSP category any trader whose position exposes 
counterparties to “significant credit losses” in the event of the trader’s default. 
To give some hypothetical examples, a small nonfinancial hedger whose counterparty was a 
dealer like Goldman Sachs would probably not qualify as an MSP under any of the definitions. In 
the event that the firm defaulted, the effect on the dealer would probably not be material or 
significant. 
In the case of a large industrial company, like Coca-Cola, it is more difficult to judge the effect, 
especially because regulatory discretion would be involved in administering the provisions of the 
statute. A company like Coca-Cola is likely to have very large derivatives positions to hedge 
foreign exchange, interest rate, and commodity price risk, and risks incurred by the financial 
assets on its balance sheet. By size alone, its positions may well meet the “substantial net 
position” test of the House bills. But it might also characterize its position as hedging commercial 
risk, and so be excluded from the definition. In that case, the question would be whether a 
hypothetical default by Coca-Cola on its derivatives obligations would cause significant or 
material harm to its counterparties (in the Senate Banking and House Financial Services versions, 
respectively) or to the financial system (in the House Agriculture version). This would call for the 
regulators to exercise judgment on a number of factors: was the position concentrated with a 
single dealer, or dispersed among a number of firms? What, under current market conditions, was 
the capacity of the dealer or dealers to absorb a loss of a given size? Was the financial system able 
to withstand the shock at that particular time? Key Issues in Derivatives Reform 
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Safeguards Applicable to Uncleared OTC Swaps 
If end-user exemptions are too broad, some portion of the systemic risks posed by the unregulated 
OTC markets will remain. In recognition of this, the bills provide additional safeguards against 
the impact of defaults by traders (or dealers) in uncleared swaps. One such safeguard was 
mentioned above—swap dealers and MSPs will be subject to capital requirements to cushion 
them against the impact of derivatives losses. Another has to do with the imposition of margin 
requirements on uncleared contracts. 
The bills direct the regulators to impose initial and variation margin requirements on contracts 
that are not cleared through a derivatives clearing organization. Again, a range of exemptions 
would apply to certain end users: 
•  Under the House Financial Services bill, imposition of such margin requirements 
is optional for swaps when one of the counterparties is not a swap dealer or an 
MSP. Any such requirements must provide for use of noncash collateral. 
•  Under the House Agriculture Committee bill, there is no explicit authority to 
impose margin requirements on swaps with end users. 
•  The Senate Banking Committee proposal permits regulators to exempt uncleared 
swaps from margin if one of the counterparties is (1) not a swap dealer or an 
MSP, (2) using the swap as a hedge in accordance with generally-accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), and (3) predominantly engaged in nonfinancial 
activities. Such exemptions would require the additional approval of the systemic 
risk regulatory agency. Regulators may permit the use of noncash collateral, if 
consistent with swap market integrity and financial system stability. 
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